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Abstract. This chapter develops a “nesting” model of deontic normative principles (i.e.,
principles that specify moral constraints upon action) as a means to understanding the
notion of a “fundamental normative principle”. I show that an apparently promising
attempt to make sense of this notion such that the “real” or “fundamental” demands of
justice upon action are not constrained by social facts is either self-defeating or rela-
tively unappealing. We should treat fundamental normative principles not as specifying
fundamental constraints upon action, but as specifying basic criteria for comparatively
evaluating and ranking possibilities.
Philosophers widely concede that what an agent ought to do depends on the options that
are, in some sense, available to her. Even full-throated defenses of so-called ideal theory
concede that our theorizing about what we ought to do “here and now” — as a matter of
policy, in the face of manifestly unjust and otherwise nonideal circumstances — must be
sensitive to myriad social facts. Yet, they contend, the “real” or “fundamental” demands of
justice do not concede to such facts so readily (e.g., Cohen, 2008; Estlund, 2014). Justice
stands among the highest virtues; her clothes must remain unstained.
The notion of “fundamental demands of justice” or “fundamental normative prin-
ciples” underlying this Nonconcessive Refrain is a vague and, I think, elusive one. In
this chapter, I present a general framework for making sense of this idea. In so doing,
I show that an apparently promising attempt to elucidate the Nonconcessive Refrain
in terms of deontic normative principles — i.e., principles specifying constraints upon
action — is either self-defeating or relatively unappealing. We can do better, I will suggest,
if we treat fundamental normative principles as specifying basic normative criteria for
comparatively evaluating and ranking possibilities.
Here’s a high-altitude map of the road ahead. I start by distinguishing between
two kinds of normative principle: one kind performs an evaluative function, the other
performs a deontic (or, as I will say, “directive”) function. I then articulate what I will call
the Uncontroversial Thesis: that directive principles are specified relative to a particular
set of salient possibilities (leaving salience vague for now). This is followed by a brief
summary of an “optimization model” of normative theories, the details of which are
presented at greater length elsewhere (Wiens, 2015a). My sole aim here is to show that the
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model offers a compelling general explanation of the Uncontroversial Thesis while also
making the implications of that thesis precise. Following a summary of the optimization
model, I take up the chapter’s key issue: namely, how we might make sense of the vague
notion of a “real” or “fundamental” moral directive. To this end, I present a “nesting”
model of directive principles, whereby one set of directive principles P is subordinate
to another P ′ if the set of possibilities relative to which P is specified is a proper subset
of the set of possibilities relative to which P ′ is specified. On this model, fundamental
directives are identified with maximally superordinate directives; that is, fundamental
directives are those that are specified relative to a maximally encompassing superset
of possibilities. At last, I consider a promising way to make sense of the notion of a
“maximally superordinate directive” and show that this is either self-defeating or leaves
us with a relatively unappealing account of fundamental directive principles. I close by
suggesting that a more plausible account of fundamental normative principles treats
these as evaluative rather than directive principles.
Disclaimer: This chapter is a companion to Wiens (2015a), in that the arguments to
follow draw heavily on the details of the optimization model therein, while also exposing
further implications of that model. Space limitations require that I merely summarize
the key ideas of the optimization model here, at the risk of demanding too much of the
reader’s attention. That model nonetheless derives support from the fact that it offers a
compelling explanation of the Uncontroversial Thesis.
1. TWO KINDS OF NORMATIVE PRINCIPLE
Let’s start by distinguishing between two kinds of normative principles according to their
function in normative theorizing.
Evaluative principles serve to comparatively assess and rank options according to
some set of normative criteria, where the relevant options include actions, institutional
schemes, or states of affairs. The relevant set of normative criteria comprises basic moral
and social values, like liberty, equality, welfare, and so on. Stated thus, basic evaluative cri-
teria are too general to yield anything more than the crudest of evaluative judgments — for
example, that a democratic society is more equal (in some sense) and exhibits greater
respect for individual freedom (in some sense) than a slave-holding society. Moreover,
there is much dispute about how to best conceptualize and operationalize basic values
like liberty, equality, and welfare. Take equality, for instance. Luck egalitarians contend
that it is best understood as a property of social distributions, namely, that distributive
inequalities are justifiable only if they are the consequence of voluntary choices (see, e.g.,
Cohen, 1989). Relational egalitarians, in contrast, argue that equality is best understood
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as a property of social relations, namely, that fellows in a cooperative scheme not be
subject to oppressive or demeaning social hierarchies (see, e.g., Anderson, 1999). At a
minimum, evaluative principles specify a candidate interpretation of the basic criteria
we use to comparatively assess options. They must also specify the relative significance
of basic values: How does equality relate to other values, like liberty and welfare? Are
some basic values more important than (i.e., weightier) than others? If so, which ones?
What’s the relative weight of these more important ones? If not, is there simply a plurality
of equally important basic values? How, if at all, do we aggregate across these? These sorts
of questions are settled by evaluative principles.
In contrast with the ranking of options delivered by evaluative principles, directive
principles mark the lines between obligatory, permissible, and impermissible options.
Directive principles perform a deontic function: they pick out a subset of options and
identify these as the options that, from a normative standpoint, are to be realized. Di-
rective principles thereby specify constraints on permissible conduct. For instance, if we
take Rawls’s two principles of justice to be correct, and if we take justice to be a deontic
concept, then we arrive at a normative injunction to coordinate our individual behavior
so as to realize (perhaps only eventually) an institutional scheme that satisfies Rawls’s
two principles. This is not simply an evaluative judgment — namely, that Rawls’s two
principles characterize the most morally desirable institutional scheme. This is a deon-
tic judgment — one acts permissibly only insofar as one’s conduct is consistent with a
requirement to coordinate on an institutional scheme that satisfies Rawls’s principles;
otherwise, one acts impermissibly.1
A general principle is not identified as evaluative or directive by virtue of its content
but by virtue of the function it serves within a normative theory. A principle of strict
distributive equality can serve an evaluative purpose without entailing anything about
permissible action: e.g., judging that a state of affairs s is normatively superior to an
alternative s′ insofar as s satisfies a principle of strict equality to a greater degree than
does s′ need not entail that the only permissible states of affairs, from the standpoint
of justice, are those that satisfy a principle of strict equality. Alternatively, a principle of
strict equality can serve a deontic purpose without entailing anything about comparative
evaluations: e.g., judging that a state of affairs s is permissible only if s satisfies a principle
of strict equality need not entail that s is higher ranked, from the standpoint of justice,
than an alternative s′ that satisfies a principle of strict equality to a lesser degree. There’s a
1 There is surely an implicit domain restriction here that provides for a minimally adequate sphere of
private conduct: roughly, one acts (im)permissibly within the “public sphere”, the domain of conduct that is
governed by a requirement to coordinate on a particular institutional scheme.
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simple reason why evaluative judgments might not closely track with deontic judgments:
the latter are subject to considerations to which the former is not. For instance, as
seems reasonable to many: which options ought to be realized are subject to feasibility
considerations in some way, while a ranking of options need not be sensitive to such
constraints.
2. THE UNCONTROVERSIAL THESIS
The starting point for this chapter is what I take to be the following Uncontroversial Thesis:
a set of directive principles is justified relative to a particular set of salient possibilities. Let’s
refine that: which options — actions, institutional schemes, states of affairs — an agent is
required, permitted, or prohibited to realize depends on the set of options that is open
to that agent in some (for now, unspecified) sense. This thesis emerges from numerous
quarters in moral and political philosophy.
Consider the dictum that “ought implies can”: what one ought to do depends on what
one can (in some sense) do (e.g., Vranas 2007; but see Graham 2011).2 Or consider cases
like Professor Procrastinate (Jackson and Pargetter, 1986). By assumption, Procrastinate
ought to accept the review assignment relative to the set of possible worlds at which he
will complete the review; yet many agree that he ought not accept the assignment relative
to the set of worlds at which he will fail to complete the review. So the directive principle
to which Procrastinate is subject is sensitive to the set of possibilities one deems salient.3
In a similar vein, consider the case of the ten miners who could be trapped in one of two
shafts, A or B (see Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010). If we block the shaft in which the
miners are located to protect them from an oncoming flood, all ten are saved; if we block
the wrong shaft, all ten die. So if we know which shaft they occupy, we ought to block
that shaft. Yet, plausibly, we ought not block either shaft when we are uncertain about
the location of the miners; in which case only one of the ten will die. (The relevant sets
of possible worlds being circumscribed here by our evidence about the location of the
miners). We can proliferate similar cases to further illustrate the point (see, e.g., Goldman,
1976).
Turning elsewhere, Rawls’s restrictions on the application of his two principles of
justice nicely expresses the Uncontroversial Thesis:
2 “Ought” is typically taken to be a deontic category, although it can be understood evaluatively too (see,
e.g., Cohen, 2008, chs. 6, 8). To avoid confusion, I use “ought” to denote a directive principle throughout.
3 It’s a distinct matter whether the requirement to accept and complete the review obtains at the worlds
at which Procrastinate fails to complete the review (see Estlund, 2011, 216ff). I set this aside until later.
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By putting these principles in lexical order, the parties are choosing a
conception of justice suitable for favorable conditions. . . . [W]e must still
ask how well they apply to institutions under less than favorable condi-
tions, and whether they provide any guidance for instances of injustice.
The principles of justice and their lexical order were not acknowledged
with these situations in mind and so it is possible that they no longer hold.
(Rawls, 1999, 215–216, emphasis added)
That is, if we specify directive principles of justice under assumptions that differ from
Rawls’s own assumptions — under circumstances that imply a set of possibilities that
are less hospitable to the realization of, e.g., equal basic liberties or a sufficient level of
economic development — we might well wind up endorsing different directive principles.
A similar thought underlies much recent discussion of the assumption of highly
idealized social conditions in so-called “ideal theory”. Valentini’s distinction between
“good” and “bad” idealizations in defense of the practical relevance of ideal theory is
representative here (Valentini, 2009, secs. 4–6). Good idealizations merely simplify re-
ality by abstracting from certain complicating features; bad idealizations, in contrast,
“distort” reality at a basic level. Good idealizations leave us with a model world that,
despite its simplicity, is a credible model of our world and can thus accommodate the
later introduction of real world complications without fundamentally altering the asso-
ciated normative theory. Badly idealized model worlds are not credible models of our
world but of fundamentally distinct alternate realities; such models can accommodate
later introduction of real world complications only at the cost of fundamentally altering
the associated normative theory. I don’t wish to interrogate Valentini’s distinction here
(instead see Jacopo Uberti, 2014). The relevant point is that much of the hand-wringing
regarding the use of idealizations in normative theory acknowledges (if only implicitly)
that a normative theorist’s assumptions about the set of feasible options — as implied
by their assumptions about the causal mechanisms that produce social outcomes — are
consequential for the content of the resultant normative theory. In short, the worry is that
different assumptions about what’s possible lead to different normative directives.
Finally, notice that the standard semantics for deontic modals (e.g., “ought”, “may”,
etc.) aligns with the substantive thought proposed here. On the standard view, “A ought to
φ” is analyzed thus: A performs φ at all of the highest-ranked worlds within a set of salient
worlds (see, e.g., Kratzer 1991; Charlow forthcoming provides helpful discussion). Which
worlds are ranked highest (as determined by the relevant evaluative criteria; “ordering
source” on the standard terminology) depends on the set of worlds that is picked out as
“salient” (those that are consistent with the relevant facts or the available evidence or
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whatever; the “modal base” on the standard terminology). So the standard semantics
implies that the semantic content of the terms we use to express obligations, permissions,
and so on — as conveyed by directive principles — is sensitive to the set of possibilities
taken to be, in some sense, available. It would be surprising to find that the substantive
content of our directive judgments is not similarly sensitive to the set of possibilities taken
to be, in some sense, feasible.
3. AN OPTIMIZATION MODEL OF NORMATIVE THEORIES
Summarizing thus far: The substantive content of directive principles is sensitive to some
salient set of possible options, those that are open or available (in some sense) to the
relevant agents. This is the Uncontroversial Thesis. A compelling explanation for this
thesis can be found in the “optimization model” of normative theories I present elsewhere
(Wiens, 2015a). I do not argue here that the optimization model is the correct way to
think about the structure of normative theories. I take the model as given and simply
summarize its key points. The model finds support here insofar as it offers a compelling
explanation for a thesis that finds support across many quarters of normative philosophy.
Ultimately, my objective is to articulate the Uncontroversial Thesis precisely and show
that a compelling explanation for that thesis leads to a relatively unappealing account of
fundamental directive principles.
The basic thought is that we can understand the Uncontroversial Thesis by viewing
normative theories as a certain kind of model. In brief, normative theories conjecture
normatively optimal solutions to well-specified problems. To illustrate the point, consider
two familiar examples. On my proposal, Rawls’s two principles conjecture a normatively
optimal solution to the problem modeled by the original position: roughly, the specifi-
cation of terms of social cooperation that free and equal persons can readily accept in
view of certain “circumstances of justice”. Similarly, Nozick’s theory of the libertarian
minimal state conjectures a normatively optimal solution to the problem of biased and
unreliable enforcement of people’s natural rights within a Lockean state of nature. In each
of these examples, a normative theory conjectures a set of directive principles as the best
way (from a normative standpoint) to solve the specified problem. (They also propose
a particular problem as the salient problem from the standpoint of justice, but I set this
aside here.)
Hopefully these examples provide a clear sense of what it would mean to treat a
normative theory as conjecturing a solution to a specific moral problem (see Wiens
2015a for a more detailed discussion). But how are we to understand the idea of a
normatively optimal solution? Recall the difference between evaluative principles and
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directive principles. Evaluative principles rank options in accordance with a specified set
of evaluative criteria (e.g., liberty, equality, security, and so on); while directive principles
demarcate the subsets of options we are required (permitted, prohibited) to realize. The
notion of a “normatively optimal solution” is understood in terms of the ranking implied
by evaluative principles: normative theories conjecture a set of directive principles as
the solution to a specific problem — in particular, a set of directive principles that ranks
highest among the available options in light of certain evaluative criteria. Put differently,
normative theories proffer a set of directive principles that, if satisfied, would bring about
a state of affairs that, among the available alternatives, realizes the specified evaluative
criteria to the highest degree.
We can make this point precise by appeal to an “optimization model” of normative
theories. On this model, normative theories have two inputs: a set of evaluative principles
and a set of feasibility constraints. We have already discussed the key features of evalu-
ative principles above. The important point here is this: we say that an option (action,
institutional scheme, state of affairs, etc.) is normatively superior than an alternative if
and only if the specified evaluative principles imply that the former is ranked above the
latter.
While evaluative principles serve to rank options, feasibility constraints serve to ex-
clude options from consideration. How, precisely, we analyze the relevant notion of
feasibility doesn’t matter for my purposes here.4 All that matters is that an option is con-
sidered feasible only if it is consistent with certain specified constraints on the realization
of basic evaluative criteria and that infeasible options are considered “unavailable” for the
purposes of a particular theoretical task. For instance, Rawls’s assumptions that society
is closed to cross-border transactions excludes states of affairs involving cross-border
transactions from consideration in the original position. For the purposes of identify-
ing principles of distributive justice for a society, such states of affairs are considered
“unavailable” (or: their availability is considered irrelevant). As a result, comparative
assessment of alternative sets of principles of justice in the original position is limited to
considering the consequences of satisfying those principles at states of affairs in which
interpersonal transactions are limited by state borders.
Whereas evaluative principles and feasibility constraints are the inputs for normative
theorizing, a set of directive principles is the output. Recall that the key function of
directive principles is to demarcate the subsets of options that are required, permissible,
and prohibited. On the optimization model, such principles are specified in light of the
4 For some recent discussion on the topic, see Gheaus (2013); Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012);
Lawford-Smith (2013); Wiens (2015b).
7
David Wiens
ranking implied by the specified evaluative principles and the limits set by the specified
feasibility constraints. In brief, a set of directive principles is specified by reference to the
set of optimal feasible options, where “optimal” is understood in terms of the specified
evaluative principles. There are several ways to elaborate this idea. Here are a few: A set of
directive principles is to be endorsed as specifying normatively appropriate constraints on
action in virtue of the fact that it characterizes, in a general way, the core institutional and
behavioral features of the optimal feasible states of affairs. Alternatively: a set of directive
principles is justified in virtue of the fact that it best characterizes the deontic implications
of a commitment to certain basic values given certain limitations on the realization of
those values. Or, finally: a set of directive principles is justified in virtue of the fact that it
conjectures a solution to a specific problem that best realizes certain evaluative criteria
under the specified feasibility constraints. These are all mutually consistent expressions
of the proposed model’s core idea.5
The point to emphasize here is that the optimization model elucidates and explains
the Uncontroversial Thesis insofar as it implies a plausible articulation of that thesis:
according to the model, the specification of a set of directive principles is sensitive to the
specification of feasibility constraints. This follows straightforwardly from three premises:
(1) Certain facts — e.g., those pertaining to the availability of material resources, or
people’s propensities to respond to different kinds of incentives, or the set of
candidates for cooperative partnership — constrain the possibilities for realizing
the specified evaluative criteria.
(2) Directive principles are specified in view of a comparative assessment of states
of affairs that satisfy a specification of these feasibility constraints — they are
conjectures about the core institutional and behavioral features of the feasible
states of affairs that best realize certain specified evaluative criteria.
(3) The institutional and behavioral features of the states of affairs that best realize
the specified evaluative principles are liable to change in response to changes in
the set of possibilities for realizing the specified evaluative criteria.
The first premise is just the (uncontroversial) claim that attempts to realize certain moral
and social values at any world are subject to feasibility constraints. The second premise is
a statement of the central idea of the optimization model.
5 An important concern that might arise here is that the model’s optimizing structure biases it in favor of
consequentialist normative theories or represents an attempt to “consequentialize” nonconsequentialist
theories (on “consequentializing”, see Portmore, 2009). See Wiens (2015a, 439) for my response.
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The third premise is the claim that how the optimal balance of basic evaluative criteria
is realized at any world depends in some respect on how that world lies. I think this
claim, too, is uncontroversial. Consider the following illustration. Suppose we have three
evaluative principles: a state of affairs s is normatively superior to an alternative s′ insofar
as (1) the distribution of the relevant goods is more equal in s than in s′; (2) the level of total
welfare realized in s is higher than in s′; and (3) the degree to which people’s labor/leisure
choices are subject to state coercion in s is less than in s′. (Assume further that none
of these principles are given lexical priority; thus, some as-yet unspecified tradeoffs are
permitted at the margins.) If we confine our attention to the set of worlds (denoted
W ) at which people’s labor productivity is insensitive to the relative size of their reward
packages, then an institutional scheme that leaves everyone with strictly equal post-
tax income will maximally realize the basic value of strict distributive equality without
sacrificing the level of total welfare realized and without requiring the state to coerce
people to make productivity-maximizing choices. For this set of worlds, the optimal
realization of the specified evaluative criteria invariably involves implementing a taxation
scheme that maximally realizes post-tax distributive equality (subject to technological
limitations). However, for a set of worlds at which labor productivity is incentivized
by relative gains (denoted W ′), an institutional scheme that equalizes post-tax income
realizes distributive equality at the expense of total welfare or by subjecting people’s
labor/leisure choices to a notable level of state coercion. For the set of worlds involving
these tradeoffs, realizing the optimal balance of values will likely require an institutional
scheme that sacrifices along all three dimensions. Certainly, it will not involve a taxation
scheme that maximally realizes post-tax distributive equality. In general, then, which
institutional mechanisms engender the optimal balance of evaluative criteria depends on
the background conditions in which those institutions are expected to operate.
What follows from the preceding is a precise articulation of the Uncontroversial
Thesis: the specification of directive principles is sensitive to the specification of a salient
set of possibilities, which is circumscribed by a specification of feasibility constraints.
Continuing with the preceding example: Suppose W and W ′ are included in the set
of feasible worlds (i.e., the worlds in both W and W ′ are consistent with a theorist’s
assumptions about the relevant empirical matters). As the worlds in W are ranked higher
than those in W ′ according to the specified evaluative principles, the resultant set of
directive principles will be specified by appeal to the core institutional and behavioral
features of the worlds in W . Without an in-depth analysis of the worlds in W (which is
beyond the scope of this paper), we can only speculate about their core features; but,
plausibly, they contain societies that realize socialist aspirations to a high degree (cf.
9
David Wiens
Cohen, 2009). Thus, plausibly, we arrive at socialist directive principles in this case (e.g.,
Carens, 1981). Now suppose that the worlds in W are excluded from the feasible set
(i.e., they are inconsistent with a theorist’s assumptions about the relevant empirical
matters) and assume that some subset of W ′ composes the set of morally optimal feasible
worlds. In this case, the resultant directive principles will be specified by appeal to the
core institutional and behavioral features of the worlds in the optimal subset of W ′. Again,
without an in-depth analysis of the optimal worlds in W ′, we can only speculate about
their core features. Moreover, our ranking of worlds within W ′ will depend on the relative
weight assigned to the specified evaluative principles, so that we can comparatively assess
the different ways of trading off among the three criteria. In any case, it seems implausible
that the optimal W ′ worlds will approximate socialist utopias; thus, it seems implausible
that we will arrive at socialist directive principles in this case.6
In general: Given the optimization model of normative theories, we can understand
the Uncontroversial Thesis as asserting that a set of directive principles is justified — i.e., is
to be endorsed for the purposes of assigning obligations, permissions, and so on — relative
to the set of possibilities that is consistent with certain specified feasibility constraints. As
shorthand, we say that directive principles are constraint-relative.
4. A NESTING MODEL OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES
Philosophers tend not to baulk when they encounter the claim that “oughts” are constraint-
sensitive in the above-modeled sense. Yet there are cases (e.g., Professor Procrastinate, the
Miner case) in which agents appear subject to competing directives. Philosophers often
deal with these conflicts by introducing distinctions among “oughts”, like “all-things-
considered oughts” versus “moral oughts”, or “nonideal oughts” versus “ideal oughts”,
or “concessive oughts” versus “nonconcessive oughts”. Consider a typical response to
Professor Procrastinate:
Sure, given that he won’t complete the review, he ought to refuse. But
6 Perhaps the optimal W ′ worlds are Rawlsian well-ordered societies, in which case, we arrive at Rawlsian
directive principles; perhaps they are right-libertarian utopias, in which case, we arrive at right-libertarian
directive principles. The results will be shaped by the evaluative principles that guide reflection on the
required tradeoffs, which are left unspecified here. The key point pertaining to feasibility constraints is that
different assumptions about feasibility will impose different kinds of tradeoffs. Insofar as the specification of
directive principles proceeds in light of a comparative assessment of different ways of trading off evaluative
criteria, the fact that different specifications of the feasible set leaves us with different options for trading
off evaluative criteria implies that the specification of directive principles is sensitive to the specification of
feasibility constraints (cf. Cowen, 2007). This is just a different way of stating the main point of this section.
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that’s just a statement about what he ought to do, all things considered,
in light of certain nonideal facts about his character. An obligation to
refuse is a concession to Procrastinate’s avoidable moral deficiencies.
Advising that he refuse the assignment might make for good policy, but it
can hardly be the case that morality lets him off the hook so easily. His
moral obligation is to accept the review and complete it.
Here’s the underlying thought, stated more generally: When considering how to best
proceed in a particular situation, we should adopt the course of action that yields the
best expected outcome from the perspective of morality.7 This requires attending to the
probability distributions over the outcomes that might arise from competing courses of
action, which requires attending to myriad facts about the world. This is simply good
policy: when deciding what to do, we should attend to how the world lies, so to speak.
But reflection on the fundamental demands of morality or justice should not concede so
readily to the facts — especially facts about our moral deficiencies.
Many people find this thought quite reasonable, its vagueness notwithstanding. One
potentially helpful way to represent the requisite notion of a fundamental obligation uses
the picture of a “hierarchy of requirements” (Estlund, forthcoming). On this picture,
requirements (i.e., directives) are arranged according to their “degree of concession” or the
degree to which the constraints under which they are specified reflect nonideal features
of the world. More concessive or nonideal directives are then said to be subordinate to
less concessive (more ideal) directives. Given such a hierarchy, we might naturally think
that the “real” or “fundamental” directives of morality (or justice or whatever) are the
maximally superordinate ones (“maximal directives” for short).8
Reflection on cases like Professor Procrastinate might convince us that directive
principles bear this hierarchical structure. Procrastinate has a concessive obligation
to refuse the assignment in light of his anticipated failure to deliver; yet there stands
a superordinate nonconcessive obligation to accept and complete the assignment. As
Estlund puts it (following Jackson and Pargetter (1986)), the nonconcessive obligation
7 This need not be read in a consequentialist manner if we understand outcomes "comprehensively",
that is, to include facts about how a certain state of affairs was brought about. See Sen (2002, chs 1 and 4) on
comprehensive outcomes.
8 One might be tempted to think that the sufficiently superordinate ones are good enough. Suppose the
hierarchy has n levels, with n representing the maximally superordinate level. Suppose we say that directives
at n−3 are sufficiently superordinate to qualify as the “real” moral directives. Why n−3? Why not n−4 or
n−2? And, if we fix n−3 as the sufficiency threshold, are the directives at level n−2 “more fundamental” than
those at n−3 in virtue of being superordinate? Unless there is a principled way to fix the threshold at some
level m < n, the fundamental moral directives must be identified with the maximally superordinate ones.
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has “primacy” because, at a world where Procrastinate completes the assignment, the
concessive obligation to refuse “evaporates”, it fails to obtain. In contrast, at the nonideal
world where Procrastinate fails to complete the assignment, the nonconcessive obligation
to accept and complete the assignment continues to obtain (this volume, XX).
As things stand, though, we are merely asserting a hierarchy of principles that grants
primacy to nonconcessive obligations on the basis of one especially suggestive exam-
ple. Can we make clear sense of the relevant notion of primacy more generally? To
do so, I propose a “nesting” model of directive principles, whereby directives appear
hierarchically-arranged with respect to each other because they are specified relative to
nested sets of possibilities. Continuing with the Procrastinate example, let C be the set of
whatever facts about Procrastinate determine that he will not complete this particular
review assignment (e.g., that he fails to form the requisite intention) and let D be the set
of background facts that are salient to the case less those in C (e.g., that Procrastinate
has received an invitation to review a book, that he is the best person for the job, that
he has the requisite abilities, that his existing obligations leave him with enough time to
complete the job, that he has certain general character flaws). Now let V be the set of
worlds that are consistent with the facts in the union of C and D and let W be the set of
worlds that are consistent with the facts in D . Notice that V is a proper subset of W — the
set of worlds at which Procrastinate fails to complete the assignment is a proper subset of
the set of worlds that are consistent with the background circumstances specified in D .
Now we restate the standard pair of judgments: Procrastinate ought to refuse the
assignment given V because he refuses at the highest-ranked worlds at which he fails to
complete; he ought to accept (and complete) the assignment given W because he accepts
and completes at the highest-ranked worlds in W . Put this way, we can see how natural
it is to think that the former directive “evaporates”, giving the latter directive some sort
of primacy. The (concessive) directive to refuse is specified relative to V and, thus, only
obtains at the worlds in V ; whereas the (nonconcessive) directive to accept and complete
is specified relative to W and, thus, obtains at the worlds in W , including the worlds in V .
Thus, the noted asymmetry: the nonconcessive obligation obtains at the worlds in V (in
virtue of those worlds also being members of W ), while the concessive obligation fails to
obtain at the worlds in W that are not in V ; when we move across worlds in W from those
in V to those not in V , the concessive obligation ceases to obtain.
To further illustrate the proposed model, consider a case where directives do not
appear hierarchically arranged: the original trolley problem alongside the variation in-
volving pushing someone from a bridge. Assume (for illustrative purposes) that one is
required to pull the lever to save the five in the original case but one is required to refrain
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from pushing the person from the bridge to save the five in the variation. It’s not at all
plausible to declare one directive (e.g., “pull the lever”) as subordinate to the other (e.g.,
“don’t push the person”). On the proposed nesting model, this is readily explained by
the fact that there is no set of possible worlds that encompasses both scenarios, rela-
tive to which one of the directives is specified. There is, of course, a set of worlds that
encompasses both cases; namely, the set of worlds at which: five people are tied to a
track; a runaway trolley threatens them with imminent death; and you are in a position to
prevent the deaths. But neither “pull the lever” nor “don’t push” is specified relative to this
encompassing set of worlds. Any directives for a particular trolley problem are specified
relative to proper subsets of this encompassing set. One subset (call it R) includes all
and only those worlds at which you can save the five by diverting the trolley to the one;
the other (call it S) includes all and only those worlds at which you can save the five by
pushing one onto the track. Since neither R nor S is a subset of the other, neither “pull
the lever” nor “don’t push” obtains at all the worlds in the union of R and S.9
By way of explanation, then: I conjecture that directive principles appear to be ar-
ranged hierarchically when the sets of possibilities relative to which they are specified are
nested, in the sense modeled above. (That directives are specified relative to particular
sets of possibilities is asserted by the Uncontroversial Thesis.10) Accordingly, a set of
directive principles is maximally superordinate if it is specified relative to a maximally
encompassing superset of possibilities. (Which is to say the following mouthful: a maxi-
mal directive is an element of a set of principles that codifies the core institutional and
behavioral features of the subset of worlds that best realize certain specified evaluative
criteria within the maximally encompassing superset of possibilities.)
5. MAKING SENSE OF MAXIMALLY SUPERORDINATE DIRECTIVES
If the proposed nesting model offers a compelling explanation of hierarchically-arranged
directives, then a promising avenue for making sense of the notion of a fundamental
9 We might nonetheless think that there is a more general directive that obtains at all worlds in R⋃S (in-
deed, all worlds in the encompassing set). Perhaps “Don’t treat persons as mere means” or “Save the greatest
number” are candidates. Then the more specific directives are applications of, and thereby subordinate to,
the more general directive. That doesn’t undermine (indeed, it affirms) my point here: that directives appear
to be arranged hierarchically with respect to each other when the sets of possibilities with respect to which
they are specified are nested.
10 I note, for the sake what is to come, that Estlund also seems to endorse the Uncontroversial Thesis. For
instance: “It is true that the non-concessive question contemplates principles chosen for the way they would




directive principle is by appeal to the notion of a maximally superordinate directive.
We’ve already seen how to make sense of a maximally superordinate directive for well-
defined, small-scale cases, such as Professor Procrastinate. According to the nesting
model, “Accept and complete the review” articulates Procrastinate’s fundamental moral
obligation (granting this for the sake of argument) because it is specified relative to a set
of possible worlds that encompasses those at which he fails to complete the review. For
these kinds of cases, we might say that the maximally superordinate directive is the locally
maximal directive.
The question to be considered in what remains is whether we can make sense of the
notion of a globally maximal directive — that is, a maximally superordinate directive prin-
ciple not just for a particular well-defined case, but for a suitably wide range of situations
of interest. For instance, a globally maximal justice directive identifies not simply which
institutions are to be realized (from the standpoint of justice) given some particular fac-
tual context; but which institutions are to be realized tout court. Put differently, a globally
maximal justice directive must make sense of the claim that some institutional scheme is
“fundamentally” required by justice, not simply that certain institutional schemes should
be implemented in the face of specific (more or less restrictive) feasibility considerations.
Estlund’s “global prime requirement” (see chapter in this volume) provides a promis-
ing basis for making sense of globally maximal directives.11 The global prime requirement
is an answer to a maximally nonconcessive question: “What principles for the basic struc-
ture of society would work out well if there were (contrary to fact) full compliance with
them, and also (contrary to fact) full compliance with all moral standards — full moral
compliance?” (this volume, XX, original emphasis) This can be readily restated in the
terms of the optimization model: Which principles characterize the core institutional
and behavioral features of the optimal worlds according to certain evaluative criteria,
given that everyone fully complies with all (public and private) moral standards?12 This
question contrasts with a set of more concessive questions, which inquire about the
principles that characterize the core institutional and behavioral features of the morally
optimal worlds given some level of noncompliance with some subset of moral standards.
There are two reasons to be optimistic about using this notion of a global prime
11 G.A. Cohen’s notion of a “fundamental normative principle” might also be thought appealing in this
regard. Space restrictions prevent me from discussing this option in detail. The short reply is that Cohen’s
fundamental principles are most plausibly thought to perform an evaluative rather than a directive function
(see, e.g., Cohen, 2008, 251–253, 265–266, and esp. 348–349). Thus, they cannot help us make sense of
fundamental directive principles. I consider the idea of fundamental evaluative principles below.
12 Notice that Estlund apparently accepts the optimization model (though not under that guise); see his
remarks on constructivist theories of justice (this volume, XX).
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requirement to make sense of globally maximal directives. First, the global prime require-
ment is meant to serve a directive purpose; it putatively performs the deontic function
of specifying constraints on action, not simply evaluative criteria (cf. Estlund, 2014).
Second, Estlund claims that the global prime requirement bears a kind of primacy over
more concessive directives; the global prime requirement is said to be maximally su-
perordinate (this volume, XX). As I’ve already intimated, Estlund argues for this primacy
claim by analogy to the Professor Procrastinate case. Procrastinate faces both a noncon-
cessive directive (“accept and complete”) and a directive that concedes to his failure to
complete (“refuse the assignment”). Estlund asserts the asymmetry noted above: the
nonconcessive directive obtains at all worlds including the worlds at which he fails to
complete the assignment; whereas the concessive directive obtains only at the worlds at
which he fails to complete the assignment — it “evaporates” once we move outside the
subset of worlds at which he fails to complete. The global prime requirement, being the
maximally nonconcessive justice directive, bears an analogous primacy over concessive
justice directives: the global prime requirement is alleged to obtain across all relevant
possible worlds (e.g., those consistent with the actual laws of nature), including partial
compliance worlds; whereas partial compliance directives “evaporate” once we move to
the set of possibilities consistent with full moral compliance.
With respect to the Procrastinate case, I’ve proposed that we understand the hi-
erarchical relationship among directives in terms of nested sets of possibilities. The
nonconcessive directive gains primacy in this (well-defined, small-scale) case because
it is specified relative to a (locally) maximally encompassing set of possibilities. For
the global prime requirement to bear an analogous kind of primacy — thereby enabling
us to make sense of the notion of a fundamental directive principle — we must make
sense of a globally maximally encompassing set of possibilities. This is the task ahead.
(To foreshadow: I think we will be led to a relatively unappealing view of fundamental
directives.)
We start by noting that, on one plausible way of posing the nonconcessive question
to which the global prime requirement is the answer, the global prime requirement
is specified relative to a set of possibilities that excludes all worlds involving partial
compliance. This is because full compliance is inconsistent with partial compliance. To
wit, suppose we pose the nonconcessive question thus: Which principles characterize
the core institutional and behavioral features of the subset of optimal worlds, given a
superset of possible worlds at which everyone fully complies with all (public and private)
moral standards? Posed in this way, the question presupposes a set of possibilities that
rules out partial compliance. Thus, the global prime requirement is specified relative
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to a set of possibilities that does not encompass partial compliance possibilities. Given
the nesting model above, we cannot say that the global prime requirement is maximally
superordinate because it is not specified relative to a maximally encompassing set of
possibilities. In particular, we cannot say that the global prime requirement obtains at
worlds involving partial compliance.
This initial worry is readily overcome. Let W be the set of metaphysically and nomo-
logically possible worlds. Let Li (i = 0,1,2, . . . , N) be a possible level of moral compli-
ance.13 We arrange these levels in ascending order, with L0 denoting complete non-
compliance and LN denoting full moral compliance. To ensure nested sets of possibilities,
we let Wi be the set of worlds at which some level of compliance less than or equal to Li
obtains. For example, W5 is the set of worlds at which some level of compliance less than
or equal to L5 obtains; since the level of compliance denoted by L4 is less than L5, W5
encompasses W4.
Since full compliance represents maximum compliance, WN =W , so the set includ-
ing full compliance possibilities is maximally encompassing.14 Since the global prime
requirement is specified relative to WN , it follows that the global prime requirement
obtains at all possible worlds. Thus far, we can say that the global prime requirement
is the globally maximal directive according to the proposed nesting model of directive
principles.
The key obstacle arises once we appreciate that full moral compliance is consistent
with myriad mechanisms for securing full moral compliance. To grasp the point, let’s
define a new variable to measure an individual’s “personal virtue”. An individual is
virtuous to the extent that she conscientiously acts in accordance with the moral directives
to which she is subject (even at the expense of any conflicting interests she might have) in
the absence of external incentives, monitoring, or enforcement. An “angel” is completely
virtuous (cf. Kavka, 1995); a “(conditional) scoundrel” is completely void of virtue — in
the absence of external incentives, monitoring, or enforcement, he never complies with
moral directives unless doing so happens to align with his self-identified interests. Of
course, an individual’s degree of personal virtue can lie somewhere between these two
13 Presumably, there are infinitely many possible levels of partial compliance, plausibly uncountably many.
I assume that, if uncountable, the set of levels of partial compliance can be partitioned into countably many
(and, thus, discretely indexed) equivalence classes, such that levels of partial compliance within the same
equivalence class can be treated equivalently for analytical purposes (i.e., the differences among members of
an equivalence class do not affect the specification of directive principles).
14 For WN to be maximally encompassing, it’s sufficient to let the union of all Wi for i = 0,1, . . . , N −1 be
a proper subset of W while still identifying WN with W . Then all Wi are encompassed by WN without the




It is evident that the mechanisms required to realize full moral compliance depend
on the distribution of virtue within a population. At one extreme, full moral compliance
is realized by a population composed entirely of scoundrels only if an effective system
of external incentives, coupled with reliable monitoring and enforcement mechanisms,
is implemented. At the other extreme, full moral compliance is voluntarily forthcoming
in a population of angels without the use of external incentive schemes or enforcement
mechanisms.15 There are an infinite number of population-level distributions of virtue
between these two extremes, requiring different institutional schemes (crudely, external
incentive schemes, coupled with monitoring and enforcement mechanisms) to realize
full moral compliance.16
Each of these institutional schemes affects the realization of basic moral and social
values like liberty, equality, security, community, and so on. The institutional schemes
required to realize full moral compliance for distinct distributions of virtue engender
distinct realizations of these basic values. To illustrate the point starkly: An institutional
scheme required to realize full compliance among scoundrels will tradeoff (e.g.) liberty,
equality, welfare, and security differently than an institutional scheme that is sufficient
to realize full compliance among angels. (I think it’s safe to say, at the very least, that the
former institutional scheme cannot afford to grant individuals the same liberties or the
same level of personal privacy to realize a similar level of security against, e.g., fraud.) As
a result, these institutional schemes manifest distinct normative priorities.
Since the “complete scoundrel” and “complete angel” distributions of personal virtue
define distinct (indeed, disjoint) sets of institutional possibilities for realizing full moral
compliance, it follows that the set of directive principles specified relative to the institu-
tional possibilities for a population of scoundrels differs (perhaps quite widely) from the
set of directive principles specified relative to the institutional possibilities for angels. Yet
both sets of directive principles are specified given full moral compliance. Thus, we seem
to have at least two nonconcessive questions yielding two global prime requirements:
one for scoundrels and one for angels. In fact, given the many different distributions of
virtue between these two extremes, we have many distinct prime requirements: one for
each population-level distribution of virtue.
One might reply that a plurality of global prime requirements causes no trouble for
15 None of this implies that a society of angels has no need for governing institutions. As Kavka (1995)
points out, a state is required to resolve reasonable disagreements among angels and to coordinate their
attempts to act collectively.
16 As above, we can assume that, if uncountable, the set of population-level distributions can be partitioned
into countably many equivalence classes for analytical purposes.
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our attempt to make sense of fundamental directive principles. A plurality of fundamental
directives is consistent with the existence of fundamental directives (see Estlund, this
volume, XX). But this reply faces trouble. The trouble is not that we are left with an infinite
set of global prime requirements (although that’s likely true). The trouble is that any set
of directives specified for a population other than a society of angels concedes to certain
nonideal facts about human behavior. For instance, the prime requirement relative to
the total scoundrel distribution concedes to the distribution of motivational deficiencies
found in a population replete with (conditional) scoundrels. The prime requirement rela-
tive to this distribution is specified by characterizing the core institutional and behavioral
features of the full compliance scoundrel worlds.17 Thus, the scoundrel prime require-
ment characterizes a balance of evaluative criteria that is constrained by concessive facts
pertaining to scoundrels’ motivational deficiencies. Similarly for prime requirements
specified relative to less scoundrelly but still not completely virtuous populations; all such
prime requirements concede to nonideal facts concerning the distribution of motivational
deficiencies within the population. We are thus left with a family of prime requirements,
all but one of which are fundamentally concessive.
The only global prime requirement that is fundamentally nonconcessive is the one
specified relative to a completely virtuous population — a society of angels. If fundamen-
tal directives are identified with maximally nonconcessive directives, then our present
attempt to make sense of the notion of a fundamental directive principle apparently leads
us to a set of directives suited to a society of angels.18
6. ASSESSING THE RESULTS
Suppose for a moment that one finds this conclusion implausible and wishes to deny
that the fundamental demands of justice for us — flawed human beings at the actual
world — are given by a standard specified for a society of angels. Given the nesting model,
17 As an aside, I note that the full compliance scoundrel worlds need not be the normatively optimal
scoundrel worlds according to certain specified evaluative criteria. The mechanisms needed to secure full
compliance among scoundrels will likely require noteworthy sacrifices of (e.g.) liberty. We can conceive of a
reasonable set of evaluative criteria that ranks scoundrel worlds that sacrifice full compliance for the sake of
greater liberty above the full compliance worlds. I set aside further discussion of this point, though it can
be pressed to create further trouble for an attempt to make sense of “fundamental” directives by appeal to
something like Estlund’s notion of a global prime requirement.
18 Note that Estlund explicitly denies that the global prime requirement is a “standard for angels”. But his
remarks at this point suggest that an “angel” is someone who not only complies with all moral directives even
in the absence of incentives, monitoring, and enforcement, but also (regularly?) performs supererogatory
action (see this volume, XX). I’m not sure how much this difference is supposed to matter.
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one can deny this by denying that the angel prime requirement is specified relative to a
maximally encompassing set of possibilities; in particular, that it does not encompass the
actual world. Yet this ultimately defeats our present attempt to make sense of fundamental
directive principles.
To illustrate the point precisely, we adopt a model similar to the one above. Let W
be the set of metaphysically and nomologically possible worlds. Let Di (i = 0,1,2, . . . , N)
be a possible population-level distribution of virtue. We arrange these distributions in
ascending order, with D0 denoting the scoundrel extreme and DN denoting the angel
extreme. (Hence, e.g., the distribution denoted by D5 is closer to the scoundrel extreme
than that denoted by D6.) Let Dα denote the distribution of virtue at the actual world,
with α equal to some i < N . Finally, let Wi be the set of worlds in W such that there are no
worlds at which D j obtains for all j > i ; that is, Di is the “highest” distribution of virtue to
be realized in Wi .
Now suppose that the set of possibilities relative to which the angel prime requirement
is specified is not a maximally encompassing set of possibilities. Then WN excludes at
least some of the worlds in W at which non-angel distributions of virtue obtain. At one
extreme, WN includes only those worlds at which DN obtains; at the other, it includes
all worlds except those at which D0 obtain. (We choose D0 without loss of generality.)
In any case, WN is not identical to W ; so WN is not maximally encompassing. Given
the nesting model, the angel prime requirement specifies the fundamental directives
only for those worlds included in WN . If W0 is not encompassed by WN , then the angel
prime requirement does not obtain as a fundamental directive for the complete scoundrel
worlds. The prime requirement for the complete scoundrel worlds is thus a set of directive
principles that concedes to certain facts about humans’ moral deficiencies. We can now
see how to deny that the angel prime requirement specifies the fundamental demands of
justice to which we are subject at the actual world: we deny that WN encompasses Wα,
the set of worlds at which Dα — the distribution of virtue at the actual world — obtains.
Now we’re in a position to clearly see the trouble this presents for our attempt to make
sense of fundamental directive principles. To put a sharp point on it, suppose no Wi is
encompassed by another W j (with i ≠ j ); then each distribution of virtue comes with its
own set of fundamental directives. But then it turns out that “fundamental” directives are
fundamentally constraint-relative, per the optimization model: “fundamental” directives
are solely fundamental relative to a particular set of institutional possibilities given a
particular population-level distribution of virtue. All we have in the end is a collection of
constraint-relative directives. We are left without anything like a maximally superordinate
set of directives. This leaves the notion of fundamental directive principles without any of
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the sense of hierarchy or primacy expressed by the Nonconcessive Refrain with which we
started this chapter.19
In sum, if we suppose that the angel prime requirement is not specified relative to a
maximally encompassing set of possibilities, then we are forced to deny the claim that
there are maximally superordinate directive principles. But, given the nesting model,
this is the claim we’re required to vindicate if we are to make sense of the notion of
a fundamental directive principle at issue here. Thus, if the angel prime requirement
is not specified relative to a maximally encompassing set of possibilities, then we are
forced to deny that there are any fundamental directive principles that can sustain the
Nonconcessive Refrain.
So the angel prime requirement is our only option for making any sense of the rele-
vant notion of a fundamental directive principle. Let’s be precise about this: Our present
attempt to make sense of the relevant notion of a fundamental directive principle leads us
to the view that the fundamental demands of justice are identified by a set of principles
that characterize the core features of an institutional scheme that is sufficient to realize
full moral compliance in a society of angels — that is, a society of individuals who consci-
entiously adhere to the moral directives to which they are subject even in the absence of
external incentives, monitoring, or enforcement.
Some might accept this conclusion without pause. But I suspect many will find this
a surprising — and relatively unappealing — result. There are at least two intertwined
reasons we might find this result unappealing: that a society of angels seems evidently
infeasible, and that a standard for angels seems evidently irrelevant. Regarding the
infeasibility of realizing a society of angels, we can’t demonstrate this of course (see
Wiens, 2015b); but it seems Panglossian to suppose otherwise. Realizing a society of
angels requires not only that everyone fully complies with the moral directives to which
they are subject, but that they do so even when those directives conflict with one’s other
(non-moral) interests and in the absence of external incentives, monitoring, or the threat
of sanctions for non-compliance. To be clear, judging a society of angels infeasible does
not rule out the possibility that humans can fully comply with the moral directives to
19 As a technical aside: We might forge a middle ground, where, for all i , j with i < j , Wi is encompassed by
some W j (except when i = N ) while W j does not encompass all Wi . This means that there are no maximally
encompassing sets of possibilities and that the fundamental directives for each Wi are specified relative to
some more encompassing W j . But I have trouble seeing how this avoids the problem. First, when j < N ,
we need to tell some principled story for why Wi is encompassed by W j and not W j+1. The most plausible
candidate is to say that, given Di , realizing D j is feasible but realizing D j+1 is not. But, second, whatever
story we tell here, we are left with the same upshot: per the optimization model, the “fundamental” directives
for worlds in Wi are specified relative to the set of salient (e.g., feasible) institutional possibilities. But then
there are no globally maximal directives, just a collection of constraint-relative directives.
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which they are subject (although I suspect some will remain skeptical about the feasibility
of that less demanding possibility too). It solely rules out the possibility of realizing
full moral compliance without the use of a system of external incentives, coupled with
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. If one grants that directive principles are
subject to some sort of feasibility requirement,20 then a set of directive principles suited
to a society of angels is excluded for imposing a standard suited for an infeasible society.
Tying in the second point, I suspect many theorists of justice think that even an
ideally just human society requires a scheme for incentivizing, monitoring, and enforcing
compliant behavior. This is evidenced by the widespread agreement among political
philosophers that limitations on individuals’ motivation to cooperate with others (“limited
benevolence”) are among the background circumstances that frame judicious theorizing
about the demands of justice. At the very least, then, any ideally just society implements
an institutional scheme for incentivizing, monitoring, and enforcing compliance for the
sake of supporting willing individuals’ efforts to comply in the face of limited motivation to
do so.21 As the angel prime requirement expresses normative priorities that are insensitive
to the need for institutional mechanisms to support full compliance, it must be irrelevant
for any society that requires such institutional supports.
Despite these skeptical remarks, I grant that some might nonetheless endorse the
conclusion that our fundamental obligations are specified by principles for a society of
angels. (I leave it to proponents to further motivate this view.) For those who find this
view implausible, I close by gesturing at a straightforward way to reconcile the idea of
“fundamental normative principles” with the denial of fundamental directive principles.
The key lies in our distinction between evaluative and directive principles. The foregoing
argument suggests that we face serious difficulties trying to make sense of fundamental
directive principles so as to vindicate the Nonconcessive Refrain that “justice ought
not concede to the facts”. But it remains open to us to treat fundamental normative
principles as evaluative principles: we simply say that fundamental normative principles
are those principles that specify basic criteria for comparatively evaluating and ranking
any options with respect to each other. That is, fundamental normative principles specify
evaluative criteria that are suitable not only for ranking options included in a specific
subset of possibilities, but for ranking options across some maximally encompassing
set of possibilities (e.g., all metaphysically and nomologically possible worlds).22 The
20 But see Estlund (2011); Gheaus (2013); for my replies, see Wiens (forthcoming) and Wiens (2014)
respectively.
21 Rawls’s remarks on the role of state institutions in supporting the stable realization of a just society are
apt here; see especially Rawls (1999, 237–238, 505).
22 Provided that the set of all options is totally comparable. As the issue of incommensurability or
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key point, though, is that fundamental normative principles perform a fundamentally
evaluative function.23
If we take this route, then there are no fundamental directive principles — such prin-
ciples are fundamentally constraint-relative. Our obligations are thus always specified by
reference to a particular set of feasible alternatives. Yet there can be fundamental evalua-
tive principles to guide the specification of our constraint-relative directive principles. I
conjecture that many will find this view relatively more appealing than the one according
to which our fundamental obligations are specified by directives for a society of angels.
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